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INTRODUCTION
“I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me,
believe me, and I’ll build them very inexpensively, I will build a
great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay
for that wall.”
-Donald Trump, Presidential Announcement Speech 1

The pledge to build a wall along the southern United States (U.S.)
land border was a central and fundamental promise in Donald Trump’s
presidential campaign. 2 Whether or not this wall is built has become
an important factor in evaluating the success of his presidency and his
chances at re-election. After Trump’s proposition that Mexico pay for
a southern border wall proved infeasible, the Trump Administration
(Administration) turned to the U.S. Congress, seeking billions in
funding for the wall. 3 This led to the longest government shutdown in
history. 4 For thirty-five days, Congress and the President stood at an

1. Washington Post Staff, Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential
Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/.
2. Michael C. Bender, How the Border Wall, Trump’s Signature Campaign
Promise, Turned into a National Emergency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:34 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-promised-to-build-that-wall-then-ran-out-oftime-and-options-11550262854; see, e.g., A History of Trump’s Border Wall,
COUNTABLE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.countable.us/articles/418-history-trump-sborder-wall.
3. See Marianne Levine & Quint Forgey, White House Asks Congress for $5.7
Billion for ‘Steel Barrier,’ POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2019, 7:49 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/06/trump-emergency-border-wallgovernment-shutdown-1082712; Ayesha Rascoe & Domenico Montanaro,
Democrats Reject Trump Border Wall Proposal, Calling It a ‘Non-Starter,’ NPR (Jan.
19, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/19/686876605/trump-offerstemporary-immigrant-protections-for-5-7-billion-in-wall-money.
4. See Meg Wagner, Veronica Rocha & Amanda Wills, The Government
Shutdown
Is
Over,
CNN
(Jan.
25,
2019,
10:01
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/government-shutdown-month2019/index.html.
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impasse over funding for the proposed wall. 5 Throughout the entire
wall saga, President Trump has relied on the same national security
messaging to support his blind dedication to the border wall: a
complete, contiguous physical barrier is necessary to keep out the
scores of deadly, criminal migrants illegally flooding across the United
States’ unprotected borders. 6 This message has been utilized and
amplified in order to support President Trump’s political ends. As the
2020 Presidential election cycle ramps up, the Administration has
doubled down on the “border crisis” and the need to stem migration to
the United States by any means necessary to garner and solidify
political support for re-election. 7
Part I discusses President Trump’s border wall imperative and his
use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to support a border wall. It examines
how President Trump utilizes a mischaracterization of who is
immigrating to the United States through the southern border, how, and
why, to serve his political ends. Part II outlines the United States’
international law obligations to asylum seekers and how U.S. law
contravenes these obligations. Specifically, it explains the nonrefoulement principle and its corollary, non-rejection.
Part III discusses the recent developments in policy and practices
that serve to reinforce Trump’s rhetoric at the expense of asylum
seekers. It analyzes the Attorney General’s recent policy shifts, which
seek to capitalize on these false narratives. Specifically, it examines the
“zero-tolerance” policy regarding prosecuting all illegal entrants to the
United States and the new guidance for asylum officers adjudicating
expedited removal proceedings. This section also discusses how
current U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) policies, either
established or de facto, are dominating the narrative of border crossers,

5. See id.
6. Trump’s comments during his first primetime speech to the nation. See, e.g.,
Full Transcripts: Trump’s Speech on Immigration and the Democratic Response,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/ politics/trumpspeech-transcript.html.
7. See Stephen Collinson, Trump Launches Immigration Rant in Bid to Rekindle
2016
Campaign
Rage,
CNN
(June
18,
2019,
10:30
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/18/politics/donald-trump-election-2020-orlandoflorida/index.html; Jeremy Diamond, Trump Launches 2020 Bid with Familiar
Refrains on Immigration and Trade, CNN (June 18, 2019, 10:42 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/18/politics/trump-orlando-rally-reelection/index.html.
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specifically in the following two ways: (1) by denying their access to
U.S. ports of entry; or, (2) upon arrival, by providing falsified or
incomplete information in their initial screening documents. Part III
also briefly overviews the legal challenges undertaken to counter these
practices.
Both Part II and Part III address how these changes are impacting
asylum seekers, in contravention of the United States’ international law
obligations. Finally, this article concludes it is critical that the rights
and protections of asylum seekers in the United States are defended and
maintained through continued challenges to illegal policy changes and
more wide-scale legislative changes to bring U.S. law more in line with
international obligations toward refugees.
I. TRUMP’S BORDER WALL IMPERATIVE
A foundational promise of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign
was to build a continuous wall along the United States’ southern border
with Mexico. 8 Trump’s hard line stance on immigration and his
characterization of illegal immigration as the source of many of
America’s problems in large part activated his Republican base. 9
Trump’s campaign was fueled by the fear of undocumented migrants—
characterizing them as “bad hombres” from Mexico and Central
America, who were criminals, rapists, and drug addicts, stealing
American jobs, taking American lives, and exacerbating the drug
epidemic. 10

8. Bender, supra note 2; see, e.g., A History of Trump’s Border Wall, supra
note 2.
9. Harry Enten & Perry Bacon, Jr., Trump’s Hardline Immigration Stance Got
Him to the White House, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 12, 2017, 5:59 AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-polls-showing-daca-as-popular-evenamong-republicans-dont-tell-the-whole-story/; see, e.g., Exit Polls, CNN POLITICS
(Nov. 23, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls.
10. Donald Trump: We Need to Get Out ‘Bad Hombres,’ YOUTUBE (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AneeacsvNwU; see, e.g., Ian Schwartz,
Trump: Mexico Not Sending Us Their Best; Criminals, Drug Dealers and Rapists Are
CLEAR
POL.
(June
16,
2015),
Crossing
Border,
REAL
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/06/16/trump_mexico_not_sending_us
_their_best_criminals_drug_dealers_and_rapists_are_crossing_border.html; see also
AP Fact Check: Trump Plays on Immigration Myths, PBS (Feb. 8, 2019, 10:44 AM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-fact-check-trump-plays-on-immigration-
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Trump’s hardline immigration stance largely contributed to his
election. In exit polling, “Trump beat [Democratic nominee] Hilary
Clinton by 31 percentage points among voters who said immigration
was the most important issue facing the country.” 11 Similarly, “[t]he
2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study found that 73 percent
of Trump voters said immigration was of ‘very high importance’ to
them, [whereas only] 24 percent of Clinton voters [stated the same].” 12
To gain Republican votes in the 2018 midterm elections, the
Administration once again turned to immigration. This time, the
Administration capitalized on the large caravan of migrants from
Central America, many of whom were asylum seekers making their
way to the U.S. border. 13 Trump characterized caravan members as
“stone cold criminals.” 14 Just days before the midterm elections,
Trump deployed 5,200 active duty military troops to the southern
border, a move some viewed as political theater. 15
In December 2018, Congress and the President reached an impasse
regarding a $5.7 billion allocation for the border wall in the 2019 fiscal
myths (summarizing major Trump claims about immigrants and offering statistics or
scholars’ works to analyze those claims).
11. Enten & Bacon, supra note 9; see, e.g., Exit Polls, supra note 9.
12. Enten & Bacon, supra note 9 (citing Stephen Ansolabehere, Brian Schaffner
& Sam Luks, Guide to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey,
HARVARD (August 2017), https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/news/announcing-2016cooperative-congressional-election-study).
13. See Christopher Cadelago & Ted Hesson, Why Trump Is Talking Nonstop
About the Migrant Caravan, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:05 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/23/trump-caravan-midterm-elections875888; Eugene Scott, Before the Midterms, Trump Harped on the Migrant Caravan.
Since Then, He Hasn’t Brought It Up., WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/08/before-midterms-trumpharped-migrant-caravan-since-then-he-has-barely-mentioned-it/; John Fritze &
Christopher Schnaars, President Trump Latches onto Migrant Caravan as Top Issue
TODAY
(Oct.
25,
2018,
4:36
PM),
in
Midterms,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/25/donald-trumpmigrant-caravan-could-help-gop-midterms/1742669002/.
14. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:19 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1067015026995879937.
15. Nancy A. Youssef & Alicia A. Caldwell, Trump to Deploy 5,200 Troops to
(Oct.
30,
2018,
1:44
AM),
Southern
Border,
WALL ST. J.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/military-to-deploy-5-000-troops-to-southern-border-us-officials-say-1540820650.
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year budget, leading to the longest government shutdown in history. 16
On January 8, 2019, in his first primetime speech to the nation,
President Trump characterized illegal immigrants as brutal killers
responsible for thousands of American deaths. 17 He then went on to
describe in detail a number of heinous acts allegedly committed by
undocumented migrants. 18 After Trump’s speech, many feared he
would declare a national emergency to justify allocating funds for a
border wall. Indeed, on February 15, 2018, less than twenty-four hours
after Congress passed a funding measure without the requested border
wall funds, Trump declared a national emergency at the southern U.S.
border, citing “an invasion of drugs and criminals coming into our
country.” 19
Many political pundits believe President Trump’s ability to deliver
on his much touted border wall promises will decide his presidential
legacy and his chances of re-election. 20 President Trump’s attack on
Central American migrants in the name of border security continues
unabated, regardless of whether or not southern border crossers are
fleeing persecution or harm. 21 President Trump’s need to justify the
16. Bender, supra note 2; see Wagner, Rocha & Wills, supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., Full Transcripts: Trump’s Speech on Immigration and the
Democratic Response, supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a
Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html; see also Olivia Paschal, Read
President Trump’s Speech Declaring a National Emergency, ATLANTIC (Feb. 15,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/trumps-declarationnational-emergency-full-text/582928/.
20. See, e.g., Paul Waldman, Trump’s Reelection Campaign Just Got a Lot
Tougher, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2019/02/15/trumps-reelection-campaign-just-got-lot-tougher/; see also Jim
Malone, Trump Sees Border Wall Promise as Key to Re-Election, VOICE OF AM. (Jan.
9, 2019, 8:55 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/donald-trump-sees-border-wallpromise-as-key-to-re-election/4736039.html (explaining Trump’s view of his border
wall promise and the reactions or views of opposing Democrats and conservative
supporters).
21. See, e.g., Hamed Aleaziz, Trump’s Claim That Migrants ‘Infest’ Country
Seen as Whipping Up Fear, S.F. CHRON. (June 19, 2018, 9:18 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Trump-s-claim-that-migrants-infest13008615.php?psid=7eyDQ; Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, President Trump Calls
Caravan Immigrants ‘Stone Cold Criminals.’ Here’s What We Know., USA TODAY
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construction of a southern border wall, in order to fulfill campaign
promises and secure re-election, has led to the implementation or
continuation of official policies and de facto practices that serve to
bolster Trump’s self-serving rhetoric. As the idea of a border wall
continues to prove politically infeasible, Trump has doubled-down on
the migrant “border crisis” and sought to enact other hardline
immigration reforms to solidify political support in the run-up to the
2020 presidential elections. 22 However, many of these policies and
practices have also resulted in the wide scale violation of the rights of
asylum seekers.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES’
APPROACH TO ASYLUM SEEKERS
The right to seek asylum is a fundamental human right. 23
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “[e]veryone
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.” 24 Under international law, a refugee or asylum seeker 25
is anyone who holds a well-founded fear of persecution based on their
(Dec. 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/26/
president-trump-migrant-caravan-criminals/2112846002/; David Nakamura, Trump
Says the Border Crisis Is About Criminals and Gangs. His Administration Says It Is
(May
1,
2019),
About
Families
and
Children.,
WASH. POST
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-the-border-crisis-is-aboutcriminals-and-gangs-his-administration-says-it-is-about-families-andchildren/2019/05/01/0f94d78c-6c37-11e9-8f44e8d8bb1df986_story.html?utm_term=.bd04e398af8b.
22. Abigail Abrams, Trump Is Again Considering Dramatic Action on
Immigration. Here’s Why, TIME (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5566328/donaldtrump-immigration-policies/.
23. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14 (Dec.
10, 1948).
24. Id.
25. The terms “refugee” and “asylum seeker” or “asylee” are often used
interchangeably. A refugee is someone who has fled persecution in his or her home
country and has been recognized as a refugee in the process; “[a]n asylum seeker is
someone who is also seeking international protection from dangers in his or her home
country, but whose claim for refugee status hasn’t been determined legally.” For more
information, see Int’l Rescue Comm., Migrants, Asylum Seekers, Refugees and
(Dec.
11,
2018),
Immigrants:
What’s
the
Difference?,
RESCUE
https://www.rescue.org/article/migrants-asylum-seekers-refugees-and-immigrantswhats-difference.
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race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion in their home country, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to that country because of this fear. 26 Refugee status is
declaratory in nature, meaning any individual who meets the
requirements is a refugee, regardless of whether this status has been
formally recognized or not. 27 A State or international organization does
not have to formally recognize an individual as a refugee before special
protections apply. 28 Although no State has a duty to grant asylum, 29
once an asylum seeker enters the territory, several international law
protections arise under various treaties and in customary international
law. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1967 Refugee Protocol) lay out the majority of these
obligations. 30 The following section briefly outlines the United States’
international law obligations to asylum seekers and how the U.S.
government has interpreted these obligations domestically.
A. International Law Obligations to Asylum Seekers
1. The Non-Refoulement Principle
Although international law does not obligate States to grant asylum
to refugees within their borders, it expressly prohibits States from
returning refugees to the country in which they fear persecution on a
protected ground. 31 This principle, known as non-refoulement, is well
26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1 (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter Convention and
Protocol] (referencing G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2198 (Dec. 16, 1966)).
27. UNHCR, Note on Determination of Refugee Status Under International
Instruments, paras. 2-3, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/5 (Aug. 24, 1977),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68cc04/note-determination-refugeestatus-under-international-instruments.html.
28. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of NonRefoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, para. 6 (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter UNHCR,
Advisory Opinion], https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf.
29. See id. para. 8.
30. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 26.
31. Id. art. 33(1).
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defined and established in international law. 32 Specifically, the 1951
Refugee Convention states that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion.” 33 This section of the 1951 Refugee
Convention was also incorporated into the 1967 Refugee Protocol. 34
Various other legal instruments have also codified non-refoulement
obligations at the international and regional levels, and the obligations
are widely accepted as part of customary international law. 35
Consequently, non-refoulement obligations bind all States, not just
those signatory to treaties that require compliance with nonrefoulement. 36 Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention envisions
limited exceptions to this principle; specifically, a State may return a
refugee if there are “reasonable grounds” that the refugee is a security
threat to the country in which he or she seeks refuge. 37 However, under
customary international law, State obligations do not allow any
derogation from the non-refoulement principle, which therefore, bars
all signatories from applying Article 33 exceptions. 38
a. Non-Rejection
It is also widely accepted that the non-refoulement principle
includes the obligation of “non-rejection” at the border. 39 In practice,
non-rejection means that asylum seekers who intend to enter a state
seeking protection may not be turned away before entering that state’s
territory. 40 Non-rejection was first included as part of non-refoulement
32. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 26; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion,
supra note 28.
33. Convention and Protocol, supra note 26, art. 33(1).
34. Id. art. 1.
35. See generally UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28 (e.g., the 1969
OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the
1969 American Convention on Human Rights).
36. Id. para. 15 n.30.
37. Convention and Protocol, supra note 26, art. 33(2).
38. See UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, paras. 12, 16 n.35.
39. See id. paras. 13 n.27, 16 n.36.
40. See id. para. 13 n.27.
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in the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum. 41 Later, the obligation
was also included in non-refoulement provisions codified at the
regional level in the 1969 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and in the
1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa. 42 Most recently, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (High Commissioner) stated
that non-rejection is implicit in the ordinary meaning of “refouler” and
that a territorial limitation on non-refoulement, meaning the protection
only applied to individuals within a country’s borders, and not at the
frontiers of its borders, would run counter to the “overriding
humanitarian object and purpose of the [1951 Refugee] Convention.” 43
b. Access to Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures
Once a refugee is present in another country seeking asylum,
additional protections under international law attach. In order to comply
with their non-refoulement obligations, all States, regardless of their
treaty obligations, must ensure that they do not return or expel
individuals who self-identify as refugees before they have made a final
determination of the individuals’ status. 44 The Refugee Convention
provides greater guidance to signatory States. “As a general rule, . . .
[contracting] States [must] grant individuals seeking international
41. See G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2312(XII), art. 3 (Dec. 14, 1967).
42. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico, and Panama, OAS (Nov. 22,
1984),
https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf;
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. II (3), June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45
[hereinafter OAU Convention].
43. See UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, para. 30; see also Brief of
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 5-6, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 506 U.S.
814 (1992) (No. 92-344) (“urg[ing] the Court to affirm the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit striking down the Executive Branch’s
policy of blocking the flight of Haitian refugees and returning them against their will
to the country from which they fled” because the plain meaning of Article 33 and the
1951 Refugee’s Convention clearly supports that non-refoulement protections apply
to State conduct, regardless of whether the conduct occurs inside or outside of the
State’s borders).
44. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, paras. 2, 6, 15.
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protection access to the territory and to fair and efficient asylum
procedures” to effectuate their international law obligations. 45
Additionally, contracting States cannot impose penalties on asylum
seekers who illegally enter their country, “provided [the asylum
seekers] present themselves without delay to the authorities and show
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” 46 Essentially, under
international law, if a self-identified asylum seeker enters a State, with
or without permission, that individual is entitled to remain in that
country, pending a fair and efficient process to establish his or her
refugee status.
B. U.S. Interpretations of International Obligations
The United States is a party to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, which
incorporates the substantive articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention,
including the provisions relating to non-refoulement and non-penalties
for unlawful entrants. 47 Additionally, under customary international
law, the United States, like all States regardless of their treaty
obligations, is bound by the principle of non-refoulement. 48 In 1980,
following its accession to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the United States
overhauled its refugee system by passing the Refugee Act, which
amended the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration
and Refugee Assistance Act. 49 The 1980 Refugee Act incorporated the
1951 Refugee Convention definition of refugee and the principle of
non-refoulement into U.S. law. 50 However, the United States has
interpreted its international law obligations to refugees in a manner
counter to or violative of prevailing interpretations of international law,
particularly by repudiating the non-rejection principle, inflicting

45. Id. para. 8.
46. Convention and Protocol, supra note 26, art. 31(1).
47. Id.; UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b73b0d63.pdf
(providing data as of July 2019).
48. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, paras. 14-16 (on nonrefoulement being customary international law).
49. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).
50. Id. §§ 201(a), 203(h)(1).
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punitive measures upon illegal entrants, and employing expedited
removal procedures.
1. Exclusion of the Non-Rejection Principle
Regarding its non-refoulement obligations, the United States does
not recognize the non-rejection principle (the prohibition on turning
away potential asylum seekers before they reach U.S. territory). 51
Instead, the United States follows the absolute State sovereignty
approach, meaning that only once a refugee is present on U.S. territory,
is the United States required to ensure he or she is not returned to a
country of origin in which he or she fears persecution or torture. 52 The
United States first adopted a policy of interdicting potential asylum
seekers in the 1990s, following the large influx of Haitian individuals
attempting to reach the United States by boat. 53 President George H.W.
Bush’s Executive Order 12807 allowed U.S. Coast Guard officials to
intercept and return boats of potential Haitian refugees without first
assessing the refugees’ fear of torture or persecution if returned to
Haiti. 54 In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this interdiction and gave
constitutional validity to the United States’ minority position against
non-rejection. 55 The United States’ position of rejecting potential
51. See Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror
Measures That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2008);
see generally UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High
Commissioner), U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977) [hereinafter UNHCR, Note on
Non-Refoulement], https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-nonrefoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html (discussing the principle of nonrejection).
52. See Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg.
23,133 (May 24, 1992); see also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
159 (1993) (holding that “neither § 243(h)(1) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952] nor Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees applies to action taken by the Coast Guard on the high seas,” where
Executive Order 12807 language allowed the United States to turn away Haitian
passengers before determining their refugee status).
53. Christina C. De Matteis, Forced Return of Haitian Migrants Under
Executive Order 12,807: A Violation of Domestic and International Law, 18 N.C. J.
INT’L & COM. REG. 431, 434-35 (Winter 1993).
54. Id. at 440. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 52.
55. See generally Sale, 509 U.S. 155.
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asylum seekers before they have reached U.S. territory runs counter to
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’
understanding of non-refoulement and customary international law. 56
2. Punitive Measures for Illegal Entrants
The United States’ immigration policy also derogates from
international law standards by criminalizing asylum seekers who cross
the U.S. border without inspection. This policy contravenes the 1951
Refugee Convention Article 31 protections against penalization. 57
Under U.S. law, individuals may be charged with a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine, up to six months imprisonment, or both, for the
following reasons: (1) entering the United States between ports of entry,
(2) avoiding examination or inspection by CBP, or (3) making false
statements to CBP while entering or attempting to enter the United
States. 58 Additionally, individuals may be charged with a felony
punishable by up to two years imprisonment if they are found to have
illegally re-entered, either by attempting to unlawfully re-enter or by
being found in the United States after having been deported, ordered
removed, or denied admission. 59 Finally, migrants with criminal
records who re-enter illegally may be punished with up to twenty years
imprisonment. 60 The criminal code makes no exception for asylum
seekers who may have good cause for entering the United States
without inspection. 61

56. See UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement, supra note 51; see also Farmer,
supra note 51, at 15-16 (“In the U.S., an individual may be barred from asylum or
refugee status under several different provisions, which are cumulatively broader than
those articulated in the 1951 Convention. The United States is, in effect, considering
refugee status determination and protection from refoulement (referred to as
‘withholding of removal’) at the same time, in a manner that improperly conflates two
parts of the 1951 Convention.”).
57. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 26.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1996).
59. Id. § 1325(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1996).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (1996).
61. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (1996).
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3. Expedited Removal and the Credible Fear Process

The expedited removal process is another policy that abrogates the
United States’ international law obligation of non-refoulement.
Expedited removal was established by the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) in response to the
mass migration of Cubans and Haitians to the United States in the early
1980s. 62 The expedited removal procedure empowers low-level
immigration officers, usually CBP agents, to order the deportation of
certain non-citizens following a brief screening of eligibility. 63
Originally, expedited removal only applied to individuals arriving at
ports of entry without proper documentation; however, in the early
2000s the procedure was expanded to include anyone “who [is] present
in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled following
inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port-of-entry, who
[is] encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the
U.S. international land border” within fourteen days of entry into the
United States. 64 Consequently, this policy applies to most southern
border crossers who are either detained at a port of entry or who are
found after having entered without inspection.
In the expedited removal process, an immigration officer can
summarily order an individual be deported from the United States,
without giving that individual the opportunity to speak with an
immigration judge. 65 The expedited removal procedure mandates that
upon arrival or detention, a CBP agent screen an individual for
admissibility. 66 The examining immigration officer must inform the
individual of his or her rights and take a written record of the
proceedings. 67 If the CBP officer determines the individual is
62. A Primer on Expedited Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/a_primer_o
n_expedited_removal.pdf. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see
generally Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2017); Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S.
Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (May 17, 2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21349.pdf.
63. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2017).
64. See Notices, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-81 (Aug. 11, 2004).
65. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2017); see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2008).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2) (2017).
67. Id. § 235.3(b)(2).
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inadmissible, meaning there are no legal grounds for the person to enter
the United States, then the officer will issue a deportation order. 68
However, if during this brief interview, an individual indicates intent to
apply for asylum or expresses a fear of return to his or her country of
origin, then the individual cannot be summarily deported. 69 The
individual must be referred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), where he or she enters the “credible fear” process. 70
For many individuals, this extremely brief screening with a CBP officer
may be the only opportunity to speak with a U.S. government official
regarding his or her fear of returning to his or her home country. That
reality leads to deep concerns about asylum seekers being wrongfully
deported.
In the credible fear process, potential asylum seekers are given the
opportunity to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum through an
interview with an asylum officer. 71 During this interview, the asylum
officer assesses whether the individual has a “credible fear” of
persecution or torture. 72 An individual has a credible fear if “there is a
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the
statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such
other facts as are known to the officer, [that] the alien can establish
eligibility for asylum . . . or [a basis for] withholding of removal.” 73 If
an asylum officer determines an individual has a credible fear, then the
individual is taken out of the expedited removal process and is referred
to the immigration court for a standard removal hearing. 74 At this
hearing, an individual may apply for asylum and can develop a full
record of the merits of his or her asylum claim with the help of a legal
representative. 75 If an asylum claim is denied, an individual may appeal
the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). 76 This standard removal hearing should be provided to
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. § 235.3(b)(4).
See id. § 235.3(b)(4)(i).
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1)-(2) (2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2008).
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1) (2019).
Id. § 208.30(e)(2).
See id. § 208.30(e)(7)(f).
Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)-(2) (2015).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.53 (2003).
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any potential asylum seeker under international law; however,
individuals placed in expedited removal must first prevail in a credible
fear interview before accessing a full removal hearing. 77 The expedited
removal process risks sending bona fide asylum seekers back to a
country in which they fear persecution, torture, or death, without a
chance at a full and fair hearing before an immigration judge.
III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE
BORDER NARRATIVE
As described in Part II, various aspects of U.S. immigration law do
not align with the United States’ international law obligations toward
asylum seekers. Although these aberrations predate the current
administration, the Administration’s recent policy changes have sought
to capitalize upon existing legal structures to propagate a politically
motivated mischaracterization of southern border crossers—further
undermining the rights of asylum seekers. These official policies and
condoned unofficial practices include: (1) denials at ports of entry, (2)
CBP intimidation and/or corruption during admissibility screenings, (3)
increased prosecution of illegal border crossers, and (4) attempted
policy changes to the credible fear process.
A. Port of Entry Denials
Adhering to its restricted interpretation of non-refoulement
obligations, the United States maintains that it may intercept potential
asylum seekers before they reach the U.S. border and that it may refuse
entry even if the individuals’ purpose is to seek asylum. 78 This
rejection has traditionally been applied to individuals attempting to
access the United States by boat. 79 In recent years, reports and first77. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, para. 8 (“As a general rule, in
order to give effect to their obligations under the 1951 Convention and/or 1967
Protocol, States will be required to grant individuals seeking international protection
access to the territory and to fair and efficient asylum procedures.”) (emphasis added);
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)(I) (2008).
78. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
79. See id. at 164; see generally De Matteis, supra note 53 (discussing the
Haitian political upheaval, the resulting mass Haitian migration, the United States’
response, the resulting legal battle in Haitian Centers Council, and the impact of that
case decision).
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hand accounts have illustrated CBP officials are increasingly
intercepting asylum seekers at legal ports of entry before they reach the
U.S. border and turning them away, or forcing them to wait days or
weeks before allowing them to approach the port of entry. 80 The uptick
of this practice has been notable since Trump’s election in November
2016 and appears to be a de facto policy of the current administration. 81
Significantly, a May 2017 Human Rights First report documented
125 instances of CBP officials unlawfully refusing access to U.S. ports
of entry to individuals seeking asylum in the border regions of
California, Texas, and Arizona. 82 In Texas specifically, these
“turnbacks” have also been documented all across the southern border
in the border cities of Brownsville, El Paso, Laredo, McAllen, Nogales,
and Reynosa. 83 U.S. border officials have employed various tactics to
turn back asylum seekers. Some individuals have been lied to by some
CBP officials with a vast array of falsehoods, including that the United
States is no longer accepting asylum seekers, that the United States is
no longer accepting individuals from their country, or that the U.S.
border is altogether closed. 84 Others have been told they are not
allowed to seek asylum at certain smaller ports of entry, and they are
redirected to larger U.S. ports of entry sometimes “as far as 50 miles
away.” 85 Additionally, some immigration attorneys working near the

80. See, e.g., B. SHAW DRAKE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE
LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT ASYLUM SEEKERS 1, 20 (May 2017);
see generally AMNESTY INT’L, USA: ‘YOU DON’T HAVE ANY RIGHTS HERE’:
ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS, ARBITRARY DETENTION, AND ILL-TREATMENT OF ASYLUMSEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2018) (discussing, among other policy effects, the
“mass illegal pushbacks of asylum-seekers at the US-Mexico border . . . [and arguing
that it is a practice] indisputably intended to deter asylum-seekers from requesting
protection in the United States, as well as to punish and compel those who did seek
protection to give up their asylum claims”).
81. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note
80, at 5, 17-22.
82. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1, 7.
83. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N., AILA POLICY BRIEF: NEW BARRIERS
AT THE BORDER IMPEDE DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO ASYLUM 3 (June 1, 2018)
[hereinafter AILA POLICY BRIEF].
84. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5-6.
85. ADAM ISACSON ET AL., WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., “COME BACK
LATER”: CHALLENGES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS WAITING AT PORTS OF ENTRY 5
(August 2018).
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border at Hidalgo, Texas, reported CBP officials were telling asylum
seekers, “Trump says we don’t have to let you in.” 86
Even if individuals are not turned back, they still face additional
barriers to entry. Some individuals have been forced to wait days or
even weeks to access a legal port of entry, under the guise of “a lack of
processing capacity.” 87 For example, in April and May of 2018, CBP
officials denied entry to migrant caravan members at the San Ysidro
port of entry near San Diego, California, forcing them to sleep outside
in dangerous conditions for up to six days. 88 Asylum seekers in
Arizona and Texas have been told that certain ports of entry are “full,”
which local advocates contend are fabricated capacity issues. 89 Since
2017, the Dilley Pro Bono Project recorded more than 130 instances in
which family units attempting to seek asylum in the United States were
denied at ports of entry; some mothers and their children waited up to
eighteen days outside of a port, with no access to food, water, or toilets,
before being allowed entry. 90
For many vulnerable asylum seekers, waiting outside of a port of
entry for CBP to allow access is a dire proposition. Those waiting at
the border face extreme heat and a lack of food, water, and protection
from the elements. 91 Individuals waiting outside of ports of entry or in
migrant shelters in border towns are also easy targets for organized
criminal groups that engage in kidnapping, exploitation, and
trafficking. 92 As a result of these illegal border rejections, many asylum
seekers have chosen to attempt dangerous unauthorized border
crossings outside of an official port of entry. 93 Mexican drug cartels
control the majority of irregular border crossings across the Rio Grande
River, and they require that individuals pay large fees to cartel members

86. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5.
87. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 3; see AMNESTY INT’L, supra note
80, at 14-20.
88. See AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 3.
89. ISACSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 4-5.
90. Interview with Katy Murzda, Advocacy Coordinator, Dilley Pro Bono
Project (on file with author).
91. See ISACSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 4.
92. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5, 16-17.
93. Interview with Katy Murzda, supra note 90.
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for passage. 94 Asylum seekers have reported that while attempting to
cross the border, cartel members extorted, trafficked, and raped them. 95
Many of these illegal crossings involve traversing extremely dangerous
portions of the Rio Grande River. Immigration advocates in the Rio
Grande Valley have reported “an increase in the number of drownings”
since CBP officials at the Hidalgo port of entry began refusing asylum
seekers entry. 96
The increased number of border rejections under the Trump
Administration has led to more asylum seekers entering the United
States without passing through a legal port of entry. 97 The
Administration has attempted to capitalize on this new trend, referring

94. See generally Jay Root, How One Migrant Family Got Caught Between
Smugglers, the Cartel and Trump’s Zero-Tolerance Policy, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2019,
6:00
AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/03/07/migration-us-bordergenerating-billions-smugglers/ (explaining that the global smuggling trade is “a
system that runs on people . . . who are willing to carve up their meager assets to pay
off a sophisticated network of smugglers, cartels, stash houses, drivers, and lookouts
[and that] [i]t’s like a cake . . . [because] [e]veryone gets their little piece”). Root
provides an example of a smuggler who provides three different package deals to be
smuggled, at prices similar to other smugglers. The VIP plan involves driving one
individual to Houston and costs $10,000. The second deal costs $7,500 and is a twopart process. First, “single adults are delivered to the border, . . . “[then] they make
their own way by foot around a checkpoint 80 miles north of it before getting picked
back up.” The last deal is “the popular bargain-basement deal: for $6,000, [the
smuggler] will arrange to deposit a parent and child on the U.S. side of a South Texas
riverbank, at which point they are left to turn themselves in to U.S. border officials
and claim asylum.” Id.; Nicholas Kulish, What It Costs to Be Smuggled Across the
TIMES
(June
30,
2018),
U.S.
Border,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/30/world/smuggling-illegalimmigration-costs.html (describing how cartels kill migrants who attempt to cross
legally or without paying them to cross).
95. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1, 16-18. See generally WASH. OFFICE ON
LATIN AM., LATIN AM. WORKING GRP. EDUC. FUND & KINO BORDER INITIATIVE,
SITUATION OF IMPUNITY AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO’S NORTHERN BORDER REGION 1
(2017), https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Situation-of-Impunityand-Violence-in-Mexicos-northern-border-LAWG-WOLA-KBI.pdf (arguing that the
situation of crimes against migrants “is compounded by ineffective responses by
Mexican authorities to investigate and prosecute [those] crimes and other human
rights violations”).
96. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 15.
97. Id. at 14.
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to illegal border crossers as criminals and false asylum seekers. 98 In
November 2018, President Trump issued an order seeking to block any
individual from applying for asylum who entered the United States
illegally. 99 This attempted asylum ban was immediately challenged in
court by immigrant advocacy groups and struck down by the U.S.
District Court of Northern California. 100
Asylum seekers and immigration advocates are also challenging the
Administration’s turn back policy. In July 2017, in Al Otro Lado v.
Kelly, Al Otro Lado brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of six
asylum seekers and all others similarly situated against John F. Kelly,
in Kelly’s official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, alleging that the CBP’s practice of turning back (“metering”)
the number of asylum seekers allowed to enter via ports of entry
violates domestic law. 101 The lawsuit claims “high level CBP officials,
under the direction or with the knowledge or authorization of [U.S.
government officials], adopted a formal policy to restrict access to the
asylum process at [ports of entry] by mandating that lower-level
officials directly or constructively turn back asylum seekers at the
border.” 102 The court decided this case on August 20, 2018. 103
Most recently, reports indicate that many asylum seekers are no
longer attempting to cross at legal ports of entry given their fears of
98. See Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 15, 2018).
99. Dara Lind, Trump Signs a 90-Day Asylum Ban for Border Crossers, VOX
(Nov. 9, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/8/18076510/ asylumtrump-border-caravan.
100. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Immigration Action at 1,
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No.
3:18-cv-06810); Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order; Order to Show Cause
Re Preliminary Injunction, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d
1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-06810-JST); Maria Sacchetti & Sarah Kinosian,
Trump Lashes Out at Judge After Order to Allow Illegal Border Crossers to Seek
POST
(Nov.
20,
2018),
Asylum,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/judges-ruling-means-trumpadministration-must-allow-illegal-border-crossers-to-seekasylum/2018/11/20/1aebd608-ecc1-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html.
101. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, 16-17, Al Otro
Lado, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 2:17-cv-05111 (C.D. Cal. filed July 12, 2017).
102. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Al
Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:17-cv02366-BAS-KSC).
103. Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
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rejection or long wait times, which are likely exacerbated following the
Administration’s announcement of its “Migrant Protection Protocols”
(MPP), colloquially referred to as the “Remain in Mexico” policy.” 104
The MPP forces asylum seekers who have been admitted at legal ports
of entry to return to Mexico to wait potentially months or years for their
asylum claims to be adjudicated in the United States. 105
This policy is being challenged by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) “on behalf of eleven asylum seekers . . . and [six]
organizations that seek to assist them.” 106 Despite clear evidence that
current policies directly caused an increase in irregular border crossings
by refusing entry to asylum seekers at legal ports of entry, the
Administration continues to characterize individuals who cross outside
of legal ports of entry as illegitimate asylum seekers. 107 CBP data
shows illegal border crossings rose ten percent between October 2017
and January 2018, whereas entries at legal ports of entry dropped by ten
104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Migrant Protection Protocols
(Jan. 24, 2019) [hereinafter MPP], https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 2019/01/24/migrantprotection-protocols; Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Kevin K. McAleenan, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, & Ronald D.
Vitiello, Deputy Dir. and Senior Official Performing the Duties of Dir., U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter January Memo],
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrantprotection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf; Camilo Montoya-Galvez & Angel
Canales, More than 10,000 Asylum Seekers Returned Under “Remain in Mexico” as
U.S. Set to Expand Policy, CBS NEWS (June 8, 2019, 9:17 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/remain-in-mexico-asylum-seekers-returned-as-usseeks-to-expand-policy-2019-06-08/. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1-2, 15-16.
105. Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, Risky ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Faces Legal
IMPACT
(Feb.
21,
2019),
Challenges,
IMMIGRATION
http://immigrationimpact.com/2019/02/21/remain-in-mexico-policy-legalchallenges/; MPP, supra note 104, at 4; January Memo, supra note 104, at 1.
106. Reichlin-Melnick, supra note 105 (summarizing the ACLU’s main
arguments); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Innovation Law
Lab v. Nielsen 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 3:19-cv-00807).
107. Julia Ainsley, Since Trump Restricted Flow at Border, More Migrants
Trying to Sneak Through Undetected, NBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019, 1:33 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-restricted-flow-border-moremigrants-trying-sneak-through-undetected-n976356. See Alyssa Isidoridy, FAQ: Why
Do Asylum Seekers Cross the U.S. Border Between Ports of Entry?, HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/ faq-why-do-asylumseekers-cross-us-border-between-ports-entry.
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percent. 108 The Department of Homeland Security’s response was that
“[t]he fact that illegitimate asylum seekers may be abandoning efforts
at our [ports of entry] (sic) means that legitimate asylum seekers at the
[ports of entry] (sic) can receive protections far more quickly — which
has been our goal from the start.” 109 This characterization of who is
choosing to cross outside of legal ports of entry is oversimplified.
B. CBP Abuse at the Border
Once potential asylum seekers present themselves at a port of entry
or are detained by U.S. officials along the border, CBP officials screen
them for admissibility to enter the United States. Under U.S. law, this
screening must include assessing whether an individual fears returning
to his or her home country. 110 Only after an asylum seeker is able to
convey a fear of return will he or she be granted the right to speak with
an asylum officer or immigration judge regarding his or her desire to
seek asylum in the United States. However, recent reports and firsthand
accounts highlight various corrupt practices that CBP officials have
undertaken to deny asylum seekers the right to apply for protection in
the United States. 111
These practices include intimidation,
misinformation, and falsification of records.
At the outset, it must be stated that independent of reported CBP
abuse of power, the practice of preliminarily screening for fear of return
at a border holding facility implicates various due process concerns.
For example, often, individuals in CBP custody have just completed an
extremely treacherous and arduous journey. They may be disoriented,
malnourished, ill, or confused. Trauma-related barriers to discussing
fear of return and/or distrust of CBP officials may inhibit these
individuals’ ability to give testimony. To make matters worse, these
preliminary screening interviews are sometimes conducted in settings
where a lack of privacy may also discourage an individual from

108. Ainsley, supra note 107.
109. Id.
110. Inadmissible Aliens and Expedited Removal, 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b)(2)(i),
(b)(4) (2017).
111. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1-2, 5-8. See, e.g., Complaint, Jose Crespo
Cagnant v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-22267 (S.D. Fla. filed June 7, 2018)
[hereinafter Cagnant Complaint].
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discussing past persecution and his or her intent to apply for asylum. 112
Additionally, asylum seekers at the border are not allowed to speak with
a lawyer or a legal representative before their CBP screening
interview. 113 Finally, mistreatment by CBP officials can create distrust
and confusion, which can lead individuals to withhold information that
may prove critical to their opportunity to seek asylum in the United
States. 114
Even if asylum seekers did not face these basic barriers and could
narrate their claims for asylum completely, various reports and studies
show how CBP corruption has obstructed the claims of legitimate
asylum seekers. 115 U.S. officials deprive many immigrants of their
legal rights in the following ways: (1) failing to provide them with
legally required information in a language of their understanding, to
inquire about their fear of return, or to acknowledge their expressed
fear; (2) falsifying records; and (3) intimidating and coercing asylum

112. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 4.
113. See, e.g., SARA CAMPOS & GUILLERMO CANTOR, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, DEPORTATIONS IN THE DARK: LACK OF PROCESS AND INFORMATION IN THE
REMOVAL OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS 8, 11 (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter CAMPOS &
CANTOR].
114. See id. at 12-13.
115. Id. at 13. See Letter from Keren Zwick, from the Nat’l Immigrant Justice
Ctr., Stephanie Taylor, from Am. Gateways, Kate Voigt, from Am. Immigration
Lawyers Ass’n, Karen Musalo & Lisa Frydman, from the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee
Studies at U.C., Hastings Coll. of the Law, Eleni Wolfe Roubatis, from Centro de la
Raza Legal, Eleanor Acer, from Human Rights First, Robin Goldfaden, from
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay Area, Amelia Fischer, from Tex.
Civil Rights Project, Denise L. Gilman, from Immigration Clinic, Univ. of Tex. Law
Sch., & Katharina Obser, from Women’s Refugee Comm’n, to Megan H. Mack,
Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & John Roth,
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Inadequate U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) Screening Practices Block Individuals Fleeing Persecution from
Access to the Asylum Process (Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Letter to Dep’t of
Homeland Sec.]; see, e.g., Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111; see generally
ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2016) (providing a follow up report to USCIRF’s 2005 Report
on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal that reviews public information and
examines field research between 2012 and 2015 to examine the recent expedited
removal process, notably revealing DHS’ failure to effectuate a majority of the 2005
recommendations).
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seekers to recant their stated fear or accept deportation. 116 These abuses
are not new; however, they continue unabated in the Trump era. 117
CBP agents are legally required to screen for asylum seekers at the
border 118 and must ask the following questions verbatim to each
individual screened for admissibility:
(1) Why did you leave your home country or country of last
residence?
(2) Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your
home country or being removed from the United States?
(3) Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home country
or country of residence?
(4) Do you have any questions or is there anything else you would
like to add? 119

The responses to these admissibility questions must be recorded on
Form I-867B. 120 However, it appears that some CBP officials have
made it a practice to falsify these documents in an attempt to keep
asylum seekers from accessing protection in the United States.
Many immigrants report they were never asked about their fear of
return. 121 In a survey of 600 Mexican nationals who were repatriated
116. CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 115, at 19-20, 27. See AMNESTY INT’L,
supra note 80, at 30, 50; Letter to Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 115, at 21; see,
e.g., CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 113, at 2, 4, 9; Cagnant Complaint, supra note
111.
117. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1. Compare OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS & U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STATISTICAL REPORT ON EXPEDITED
REMOVAL, CREDIBLE FEAR, AND WITHDRAWAL, FY 2000-2003 (Feb. 2005) (seeking
to determine whether CBP officers were improperly processing, removing, and
detaining aliens who might be eligible for asylum admission), with Letter to Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., supra note 115 (providing examples of individuals attesting to not
being asked about their fear, not having their fear acknowledged, and being coerced).
118. CBP officials’ duty to screen asylum seekers starts with having to use Form
1-867A, which requires the officer to state that U.S. law offers asylum to people facing
persecution, harm, or torture if returned to their home country. Form 1-867A is
reproduced in Letter to Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 115, at 7; see 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(2)(i) (2017) (stating that Form I-867A and I-867B must be used in
determining admissibility).
119. CBP officials must use Form 1-867B, reproduced in Letter to Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., supra note 115, at 7-8.
120. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2017).
121. See CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 113, at 5.
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to Mexico between August 2016 and April 2017, 55.7% of the
respondents reported that they were not asked if they feared returning
to their home country. 122 For these more than 300 individuals who were
deported allegedly without having been screened for fear, CBP officials
must create a transcript of the admissibility interview on
Form I-867B. 123 Meaning, records must exist to demonstrate whether
these individuals stated to a CBP official that they had no fear of return.
This raises legitimate concerns that transcripts are being falsified.
Ongoing litigation in the case of Crespo Cagnant v. United States
also helps to illustrate the types of corrupt actions allegedly being
undertaken by CBP officials. In June 2018, plaintiff Jose Crespo, an
asylum seeker from Mexico, sued the U.S. government, claiming he had
been wrongfully deported without the opportunity to express a fear of
return. 124 The case alleges that the CBP official who interviewed
Crespo unlawfully prevented him from seeking asylum by falsifying
information in the Form I-867B, including falsely stating, among other
things, that Crespo was interviewed in Spanish, did not express a fear
of return to Mexico, had never been to the United States, and had come
to the United States “to live and work in McAllen, Texas.” 125 However,
Crespo alleges he was not interviewed in Spanish, but in English, and
he never stated that he was not afraid to return to Mexico or that he had
come to the United States to work in Texas. 126 On the contrary, Crespo
had previously lived and studied in Miami, Florida, and was returning
to the United States for fear of persecution and to live with his partner
in Miami while seeking asylum. 127 This case is currently pending as of
June 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. 128
122. Id. at 1-2.
123. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2017). Transcripts of an asylum seeker’s
admissibility interview, recorded by CBP officers in Form I-867A & B, Record of
Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235(b)(1) of the Act, are included in
an individual’s Alien File (“A” file) and are therefore available to asylum officers
conducting credible fear interviews.
124. Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111, at 1, 7.
125. Id. at 7-10.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 5, 9.
128. Notice of Appeal at 1, Jose Crespo Cagnant v. United States, No. 1:18-cv22267 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 13, 2019).
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Furthermore, many asylum seekers who are asked about their fear
of return are coerced or intimidated into recanting their fear. A 2017
Human Rights First report provides various examples of these
tactics. 129 In one instance, a Mexican family retracted its claim after
CBP officials threatened to call Mexican police to jail the family
members if they continued to claim fear of persecution by their
government. 130 Other asylum seekers report being forced to sign
deportation documents or unknown papers instead of being allowed to
proceed with their asylum claim, even after claiming fear of return. 131
In the American Immigration Lawyers Association/Programa de
Defensa e Incidencia Binacional (AILA/PDIB) survey, 50.7% of
respondents stated that “they were not allowed to read [their
deportation] documents” before being forced to sign, and 58.1% stated
that these forms were presented to them only in English. 132 Many of
these individuals did not understand they were accepting deportation
despite continually expressing fear and/or intent to apply for asylum. 133
In instances where asylum seekers have successfully triggered the
credible fear process during an admissibility screening, CBP officials
are also reported to have falsified or mischaracterized border interview
records to undermine legitimate asylum claims. For example, “a CBP
officer reportedly asked an asylum seeker, ‘What will you do if you are
granted asylum in the United States? Work? Okay, so you are here to
work.’” 134 The CBP agent then recorded that the asylum seeker came
to the United States for work, creating a false impression that the
individual had not come to the United States out of fear. 135 In another
well-known case, Matter of M-R-R-, CBP officials signed a sworn
interview transcript with a three-year-old child that stated the child had
supposedly left his home country “to look for work.” 136 Given the

129. See, e.g., DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 11-12.
130. Id. at 12.
131. CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 113, at 7-11.
132. Id. at 9.
133. Id.
134. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 12.
135. Id. at 12.
136. Elise Foley, Infants and Toddlers Are Coming to the U.S. to Work,
(June
16,
2015),
According
to
Border
Patrol,
HUFFPOST
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/border-patrol-babies_n_7594618.
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child’s tender age, it is highly unlikely that these records reflected the
true conversation conducted by the CBP official.
While not all falsified information in admissibility transcripts can
be said to have been made with malicious intent, Crespo Cagnant v.
United States and Matter of M-R-R- both help to demonstrate CBP’s
proclivity to falsify information regarding critical screening for asylum
claims. Although legal challenges such as these help to identify the
types of material misrepresentations that are included in admissibility
screening documents, the pervasiveness of falsified information
remains unclear. 137 Deep concerns about CBP officials’ corrupt and
abusive behavior during asylum screenings have continued unabated,
although not unchallenged, for over a decade. 138 Moreover, steps
toward reform are unlikely during this administration. On the contrary,
the Trump Administration has attempted to enact policies in an apparent
attempt to capitalize off of these common misstatements. These
policies are further discussed in subsection D, Policy Changes to the
Credible Fear Process.
C. Increased Prosecution of Illegal Border Crossers
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has a long tradition of prosecuting
asylum seekers for illegal entry or reentry into the United States. In
2005, the DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
launched a joint initiative named Operation Streamline. The initiative
aimed to improve the efficiency of the process of referring individuals
from the DHS to the DOJ for prosecution, following a DHS
determination that the individual has entered the United States without
inspection. 139 As a result, a few years ago, “[i]llegal entry (under 8
U.S.C. § 1235) and illegal re-entry (under 8 U.S.C. § 1326) [were] the
most prosecuted federal crimes in the United States.” 140 Historically,
prosecution efforts focused on individuals who had illegally re-entered
137. In my own immigration practice, it is quite common for an individual in
credible fear proceedings to have false statements recorded in their CBP admissibility
screening transcript.
138. See, e.g., Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111; Foley, supra note 136.
139. Fact Sheet: Criminal Prosecutions for Unauthorized Border Crossing,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/operationstreamline-issue-brief.
140. Id.
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the United States. 141 Between 1992 and 2012, the number of
individuals convicted for illegal re-entry increased by twenty-eight
times, accounting for forty-eight percent of the total growth of overall
federal convictions during this period. 142 Prosecution of first time
offenders was less prolific. 143 As a policy, Operation Streamline makes
no exception for border crossers who express a fear of persecution or
torture if returned to their home country. 144 In fact, the DHS Inspector
General admitted that prosecution of asylum seekers under Operation
Streamline was “inconsistent with and [possibly] violate[d] U.S. treaty
obligations.” 145 Indeed, some boilerplate plea agreements presented to
illegal entrants and re-entrants required that they waive their right to
apply for asylum or protection against persecution in their home
country. 146
Recently, in April 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions
announced a “zero-tolerance” policy for illegal entrants that called on
U.S. Attorney’s Offices along the southern border to prosecute all
referred cases for violations of 8 U.S.C. section 1325(a) “to the extent
practicable.” 147
This policy move was consistent with the
Administration’s mischaracterization of southern border crossers as
criminals. The “zero-tolerance” policy meant federal prosecutors were
encouraged to prosecute each and every asylum seeker who did not
present themselves at a port of entry, regardless of whether these
individuals had turned themselves over to CBP or had legitimate
reasons for entering without inspection. In announcing the new policy,
Sessions stated that zero tolerance was necessary to address a crisis at
141. See Michael T. Light, The Rise of Federal Immigration Crimes: Unlawful
RES.
CTR.
(Mar.
18,
2014),
Reentry
Drives
Growth,
PEW
https://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/.
142. Id.
143. NATASHA ARNPRIESTER & OLGA BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 4 (Jan. 2018).
144. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PROSECUTING MIGRANTS FOR COMING TO
THE UNITED STATES 5 (May 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/research/prosecuting_migrants_for_coming_to_the_united_states.
pdf.
145. Id.
146. ARNPRIESTER & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 19-20.
147. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General
Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018).
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the southern border that was caused by Congress’ failure to “pass
effective legislation that serves the national interest[,] . . . closes
dangerous loopholes[,] and fully funds a wall along our southern
border.” 148
However, Sessions failed to mention how the
Administration’s implicitly sanctioned CBP policies of rejection and
metering were greatly contributing to the increase in irregular border
crossings.
During the Trump Administration and the month before the new
“zero-tolerance” policy was implemented, prosecutions of first time
illegal entrants skyrocketed—increasing by 448.1%. 149 The majority
of the controversy surrounding this new policy focused on the
humanitarian crisis created by the illegal separation of parents from
their children. 150 Under the policy, parents were detained and forced to
await prosecution while their children were classified as
unaccompanied minors and transferred to Health and Human Services’
Office of Refugee Resettlement. 151 However, the negative impact that
this dramatic increase in prosecutions of illegal entry had on asylum
seekers’ ability to seek protection in the United States must also be
recognized. It is unknown exactly how many asylum seekers may have
been coerced into pleading guilty and may have forgone their right to
seek asylum in the United States in exchange for little to no prison time.
Furthermore, even for asylum seekers who are given the opportunity to
continue to pursue their asylum claims after conviction of an entryrelated defense, additional barriers still exist; the DHS often prioritizes
the future criminal prosecution or deportation of individuals with prior
federal convictions. 152
Increasing prosecutions of illegal border crossers, including asylum
seekers, buttressed Trump’s hateful immigrant rhetoric. In addition to
branding asylum seekers who felt increasingly obligated to enter the
148. Id.
149. Immigration Prosecutions for February 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Mar.
26, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/ monthlyfeb18/fil/.
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Ms. L v. ICE (June 6,
2019), https://www.aclu.org/cases/ms-l-v-ice.
151. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Zero-Tolerance
(June
23,
2018),
Prosecution
and
Family
Reunification
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/23/fact-sheet-zero-tolerance-prosecution-andfamily-reunification.
152. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 4.
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United States outside of a port of entry as “illegitimate,” the
Administration was able to use the “zero-tolerance” policy to classify
them as federally convicted criminals as well.
D. Policy Changes to the Credible Fear Process
The Trump Administration has heightened the legal standard for
credible fear and increased the scrutiny of asylum claims during the
credible fear screening process, in another attempt to undermine the
refugee exception to the expedited removal process. 153 Once an
individual in the expedited removal process expresses a fear of return
to his or her home country or intent to apply for asylum, CBP officials
must refer the individual to USCIS for a credible fear screening. 154 If
an individual establishes a credible fear of persecution or torture if
repatriated, the asylum officer must refer that person to an immigration
judge to adjudicate his or her asylum claim in removal proceedings
under INA section 240. 155 According to the Administration, thousands
of illegal, criminal immigrants are abusing and defrauding this system
simply by stating “the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear
process”—they fear returning home. 156
In his 2017 remarks to the Executive Office of Immigration
Review, Sessions made it clear that the Administration believes “[t]he
[credible fear] system is being gamed . . . [and] has become an easy
ticket to illegal entry into the United States.” 157 According to Sessions,
“[s]aying a few simple words is now transforming a straightforward
arrest and immediate return into a probable release and a hearing.” 158
153. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES – RAIO, ASYLUM
DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND
TORTURE DETERMINATIONS (effective Feb. 27, 2017) [hereinafter USCIS CREDIBLE
FEAR LESSON PLAN] (on file with American Immigration Lawyers Association),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/raio-and-asylum-division-officer-training-course;
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
154. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2008).
155. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2019).
156. Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to the Executive
Office
for
Immigration
Review
(Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarksexecutive-office-immigration-review.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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Furthermore, Sessions claimed the adjudication process is also broken
because “DHS found a credible fear in 88 percent of claims
adjudicated[, which] means an alien entering the United States illegally
has an 88 percent chance to avoid expedited removal simply by
claiming a fear of return.” 159 To reduce the amount of asylum seekers
entering the United States, Sessions announced the Administration’s
plans to make it more difficult for asylum seekers in expedited removal
proceedings to receive a positive finding of credible fear. 160 In other
words, because U.S. government officials too frequently found
southern border crossers to be legitimate asylum seekers, undermining
Trump’s self-serving imagery of criminal immigrant masses
endangering the security of the United States, the Administration made
it more difficult for asylum seekers to access legal protections.
One way in which the Administration sought to achieve this was to
amend the guidance given to the Asylum Office regarding credible fear
determinations. In February 2017, the USCIS amended its “Credible
Fear Lesson Plan,” elevating the threshold of the “credibility”
requirements for asylum seekers. 161 Previously, to find the applicant
credible, an asylum officer only needed to find that an individual had
“‘a significant possibility’ that, in a full hearing, an immigration judge
could deem the applicant credible.” 162 Under the new guidance, USCIS
clarified that a “significant possibility” was more than a “mere
possibility.” 163 The new guidance also introduced more stringent
requirements that the asylum officer find the claim not only credible,
but also persuasive and specific. 164 These new requirements raised
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 153; see USCIS Amends
Credible Fear Lesson Plans, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC.,
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-amends-credible-fear-lesson-plans (last visited
July 21, 2019) (identifying the revised Credible Fear Lesson Plan’s three major
changes and explaining the seemingly increased threshold poses greater difficulty for
bona fide asylum seekers).
162. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83.
163. USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 153, at 15.
164. Id. at 14. See USCIS Amends Credible Fear Lesson Plans, supra note 161.
Since the writing of this article, USCIS has issued newer guidance in an April 30,
2019, Credible Fear Lesson Plan. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES –
RAIO, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF
PERSECUTION
AND
TORTURE
DETERMINATIONS
(Apr.
30,
2019),
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asylum seekers’ burden, heightening the level of specific, sensitive, and
traumatic details that they must provide to establish a credible fear.
Positive credible fear determinations dropped four percent in the first
eleven months following the application of this new guidance. 165
Next, Sessions issued a broad-scale attack on credible fear
determinations and asylum protections more generally in his Matter of
A-B- decision. 166 In Matter of A-B-, the respondent was a Salvadoran
woman fleeing physical, emotional, and sexual abuse from her exhusband. 167 The Board of Immigration Appeals found that she was
eligible for asylum based on persecution because of her membership in
the “particular social group of ‘El Salvadoran women who are unable
to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in
common’ with their partners”; that classification was sufficiently
similar to the social group of “‘married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship,’ which the Board [of Immigration
Appeals previously] had recognized in Matter of A-R-C-G-.” 168 In
referring the case, Sessions sought to review under what circumstances
“being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable
‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or
withholding of removal.” 169 Many immigration advocates saw
Session’s resulting decision as a full-scale attack on asylum seekers
fleeing domestic abuse and gang-related crimes in Central America.
In Matter of A-B-, Sessions prescribed that individuals fleeing
persecution by private actors, such as domestic abusers or gang
members, would have difficulty establishing a nexus to a protected
ground. He stated that “[w]hen private actors inflict violence based on
a personal relationship with a victim, then the victim’s membership in
a larger group may well not be ‘one central reason’ for the abuse[, . . .
especially] [w]hen ‘the alleged persecutor is not even aware of the

https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/mkt/11/10239/10146/2019%20training%20do
cument%20for%20asylum%20screenings.pdf.
165. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 5 n.44.
166. See generally Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), the Attorney General may review any decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals that he or she directs the BIA to refer.
167. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
168. Id. at 321 (quoting Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)).
169. Id. at 317 (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
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group’s existence.’” 170 Sessions also raised the burden regarding the
government protection element of an asylum claim, declaring that
asylum seekers fleeing private actors “must show more than [mere]
‘difficulty . . . controlling’ private behavior”; 171 additionally, asylum
seekers “must show that the government condoned the private actions
‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect
victims.’” 172 Sessions also highlighted that asylum seekers should face
increased scrutiny regarding their ability to safely relocate within their
home country to avoid persecution by a private actor because “[w]hen
the applicant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few
specific individuals, internal relocation would seem more
reasonable.” 173 Ultimately, Sessions went as far as to declare that
“[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for
asylum.” 174
Sessions also lambasted the credible fear process:
Finally, there are alternative proper and legal channels for seeking
admission to the United States other than entering the country
illegally and applying for asylum in a removal proceeding . . . .
Aliens seeking a better life in America are welcome to take
advantage of existing channels to obtain legal status before entering
the country. In this case, A-B- entered the country illegally, and when
initially apprehended by Border Patrol agents, she stated that her
reason for entering the country was “to find work and reside” in the
United States. Aliens seeking an improved quality of life should seek
legal work authorization and residency status, instead of illegally
entering the United States and claiming asylum. 175

In a final footnote, Sessions reminded all asylum adjudicators that
asylum is a discretionary form of relief that is not automatically granted
when an applicant meets the statutory eligibility requirements. 176 He
170.
171.
2005)).
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 338-39 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).
Id. at 337 (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir.
Id. at 337 (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 345.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 345 n.12.
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provided a list of relevant discretionary factors, the first of which was
“the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures.” 177 USCIS guidance
to asylum officers adjudicating credible fear claims built on this closing
salvo:
USCIS personnel may find an applicant’s illegal entry, including any
intentional evasion of U.S. authorities, and including any convictions
for illegal entry where the alien does not demonstrate good cause for
the illegal entry, to weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.
In particular, “the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures”
factor may take into account whether the alien entered the United
States without inspection and, if not, whether the applicant had other
ways to lawfully enter this country . . . . An officer should consider
whether the applicant demonstrated ulterior motives for the illegal
entry that are inconsistent with a valid asylum claim that the
applicant wished to present to U.S. authorities. 178

The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- was immediately
binding precedent on all DHS officers and employees, including USCIS
officers and immigration judges. 179
Session’s holding in Matter of A-B- sought to wipe out a large
swath of potential asylum claims. The holding conveniently pulled
together the negative repercussions of various Trump era policies to
serve in rejecting the legitimate claims of asylum seekers and to bolster
the Administration’s imagery of illegal border crossers as criminals and
threats to national security. For example, increased port of entry denials
and CBP abuse at the border led to a significant increase in the number
of individuals entering the United States illegally, which should now
“weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.” 180 Similarly,
“ulterior motives for illegal entry,” such as the statements included in
falsified CBP admissibility screenings and convictions for illegal entry,
which increased markedly with Trump’s “zero-tolerance” policy,
should now also be considered adverse factors for discretionary asylum
177. Id.
178. Memorandum from the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services on
Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee
Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B- (July 11, 2017) [hereinafter USCIS
Guidance for Processing] (on file with American Immigration Lawyers Association).
179. 8 C.F.R. § 103.10(b) (2011); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2018).
180. USCIS Guidance for Processing, supra note 178.
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relief. 181 In August 2018, the ACLU challenged these new policies on
behalf of numerous asylum seekers who were processed according to
the Matter of A-B- guidelines and denied at the credible fear review
level. 182 The ACLU asserted that the policy changes were inconsistent
with the Refugee Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 183 In December 2018, the District Court for the District
of Columbia found that the majority of the higher legal standards
contained in Matter of A-B- were arbitrary, capricious, and violative of
U.S. immigration law. 184 Accordingly, the court enjoined the DHS
from applying those parts in future credible fear proceedings. 185
CONCLUSION
In 2016, Donald Trump ran a successful presidential campaign
predicated on fear and racism. Since his election, he has continued to
build on his anti-immigrant rhetoric to maintain public support as he
zealously attempts to fulfill a key campaign promise to build a border
wall. In a last-ditch effort to secure funding for this wall, Trump has
declared a national emergency grounded in the idea that the influx of
illegal border crossers is an attack on U.S. security and safety. The
possibility that a substantial percentage of these individuals might be
legitimate asylum seekers serves to undermine this political position.
As a result, steps have been taken to delegitimize asylum seekers.
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has tacitly or explicitly
approved the implementation of policies that sought to achieve the
following objectives: (1) drive potential asylum seekers away from
legal ports of entry, (2) penalize them with criminal prosecution or
divest them of the right to seek asylum if they crossed the border
illegally, (3) raise the legal burden of proof in establishing a credible
fear of persecution for individuals in expedited removal proceedings;
and (4) deny discretionary asylum in cases of illegal border crossings
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grace v.
Sessions, No. 1:18-cv-01853 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2018).
183. Id.
184. Order, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv01853).
185. Id.
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and convictions for illegal entry. U.S. immigration law diverges from
international law in various ways regarding the rights of asylum seekers
and the obligations of receiving States, namely by failing to observe the
non-rejection principle of non-refoulement, penalizing illegal border
crossers, and implementing the credible fear process.
The
Administration has been able to build upon these inconsistencies in an
attempt to impugn asylum seekers and substantiate false claims for
political gain.
However, asylum seekers and immigration advocates have resisted
each of the Administration’s politically-motivated attempts to
implement policies geared toward negatively shaping the public
imagery of immigration into the United States. Following fast actions
by the immigration legal community, the courts have struck down or
temporarily enjoined a number of policies aimed specifically at
stripping asylum seekers of their rights. 186 But the fight has only just
begun. As the United States gears up for the 2020 elections, Trump
continues to lean on his anti-immigration, fear-based rhetoric in an
attempt to solidify his base and garner additional political support. 187
Further, new policies seeking to restrict the flow of legitimate asylum
seekers to the United States, in contravention of non-refoulement
obligations, are continuously being devised. 188
The current administration has utilized, and weaponized, the
existing immigration legal framework to support its political ends.
186. See, e.g., id.; Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
187. During a March 2019 campaign rally, President Trump openly mocked an
asylum seeker who appeared to be too strong-looking to be fleeing persecution, before
blanketly calling asylum claims a “big fat con job.” Kate Riga, WATCH: Trump
Mocks Asylum Seekers at Rally, Calls Process a ‘Big Fat Con Job’, TALKING POINTS
MEMO (Mar. 29, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/trumpmocks-asylum-seekers-rally-big-fat-con-job.
188. See, e.g., Makini Brice, Trump Threatens More Tariffs on Mexico over
Part of Immigration Deal, REUTERS (June 10, 2019, 3:51 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico/trump-threatens-more-tariffson-mexico-over-part-of-immigration-deal-idUSKCN1TB182; Press Release, Human
Rights First, Safe Third Country Agreement with Guatemala Would Endanger, Not
Protect Refugees (June 14, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pressrelease/safe-third-country-agreement-guatemala-would-endanger-not-protectrefugees; Louise Radnofsky, Trump Says Guatemala Is Set to Help Stem Migrant
Flow, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2019, 12:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumpsays-guatemala-is-set-to-help-stem-migrant-flow-11560833062.
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While civil society and the legal community must continue to valiantly
challenge these new, restrictive policies head-on, more systemic
reforms are also required to strengthen the statutory and regulatory
framework of U.S. immigration law to bring it more in line with
international obligations toward asylum seekers. Recognition of the
non-rejection principle of non-refoulement should be codified in U.S.
law, as should exceptions from criminal prosecution for illegal entrants
seeking asylum. The process of expedited removal should also be
thoroughly examined and overhauled to ensure compliance with nonrefoulement obligations. The first step in building the political support
and movement necessary for such reforms must be to counter the false
rhetoric that surrounds U.S. immigration policy and discourse.
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